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Germany is often described as a ‘reluctant hegemon’ in the sense that it has found itself pushed to
the centre of EU aﬀairs by the Eurozone crisis. Peter Nedergaard and Holly Snaith write that the
increasing importance of Germany in the EU has resulted in a particular brand of German
‘ordoliberal’ thinking becoming institutionalised at the European level. They argue that this has had
some unintended consequences for Germany, which now ﬁnds itself trapped in the centre of a crisis
that it can no longer control.
Few could look at the contemporary shape of the Eurozone and argue that there have not been
some fairly major unintended consequences. Indeed, one would rather hope that is the case,
because the reverse would imply that policymakers intended to create the conditions for the chaos
that has resulted.
In a recent study, we explore how the current or historic state of integration ﬁts with actors’
preferences, and how the integration of those preferences may ultimately produce perverse
outcomes. Ultimately, our primary concern is Germany: Germany has of course been a key player
in designing and maintaining, not always successfully, the rules-based framework of the Eurozone and its
predecessors. Our analysis is based in part on a series of interviews obtained with senior civil servants within the
German ﬁnance and foreign ministries (the Bundesministerium der Finanzen and Auswärtiges Amt). And we
ultimately conclude that, like the travellers in Rimbaud’s famous poem ‘The Drunken Boat’, Germany is increasingly
akin to the protagonist who laments their experience, ‘As I drifted on a river I could not control, No longer guided by
the bargemen’s ropes…’
We use a perspective based on Robert Merton’s
classic, and elegantly simple, analysis of unintended
consequences in order to frame Germany’s
engagement with the Eurozone. Merton’s ultimate
insight is that when actors engage in ‘purposive
social action’ to eﬀect a certain end, these actions
often do not produce the eﬀects desired by the
original actor, for four reasons. The most obvious
hindrance is provided by the existing state of
knowledge (or lack of knowledge), as the information
on which we base our action is inevitably incomplete.
Other ﬁelds from which unintended consequences
can arise include error (a failure to recognise that
procedures that have been successful in certain
contexts need not to be so under all circumstances);
the ‘imperious immediacy of interest’ (an overriding
concern with anticipated positive consequences that
stiﬂes other possible consequences: in other words,
wilful ignorance); and the inﬂuence of ‘basic values’ (where actors are so wedded to the necessity of ‘certain actions
conjoined by certain fundamental values’ that they cannot conceive of alternatives). Using Merton’s framework, we
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would argue that whilst all of these facets can be seen in the case of the Eurozone, many of the pathologies
witnessed during the crisis can be attributed to ordoliberalism functioning as a ‘basic value’ of German policy-
makers, which functions to shut out alternatives.
The Freiburg, or ‘Ordoliberal’ School, originated in a highly inﬂuential group of German economists and lawyers
operating from 1936 onwards, with Walter Eucken (1891-1950) and Franz Böhm (1895-1977) as the key scholars.
Under an ordoliberal conception, the basis of a successful economic policy is the establishment of a strong legal and
institutional framework, which Eucken termed ‘Ordnungspolitik‘ – literally, ordered politics. The distinctiveness of
ordoliberalism comes into sharp relief when it is compared to Keynesianism and neoliberalism. Ordoliberal
philosophy does not, for example, authorise unlimited intervention in the market. Instead it advocates a speciﬁc type
of state intervention (namely, that it should provide the circumstances that best facilitate a competition oriented
market), which diﬀerentiates it strongly from Keynesianism.
Ordoliberalism is nonetheless more committed to state activity than laissez-faire liberalism (often equated in a
contemporary context to neoliberalism) in particular to prevent the emergence of cartels. Five principles of
ordoliberalism can be delineated (injunctions to avoid limits on liability, and eﬀect price stability, constitutional
predictability in economic policy, and restraints on economic steering). As our interviews found, self-proclaimed
ordoliberals are rife within the German Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, with responses stating, for
instance, that ‘there is a very strong ordoliberal tradition within the administration, which is irrespective of left-right
patterns’, and that there is ‘a deep ingrained preference for a kind of German ordoliberal crisis management’.
It was not until the Eurozone crisis that ordoliberalism really gained recognition as a model of state organisation
beyond Germany’s borders. The obvious cause of this resurgence was the spread of austerity across Europe
accompanied by the widespread perception that this was the result of a set of distinctively Germanic economic
norms. We have traced the presence of ordoliberal political involvement in the history of European monetary
integration, through the Werner plan and ‘snake in the tunnel’ of 1971-1973, the European Monetary System, and
the negotiations over Maastricht (in particular, the Stability and Growth Pact).
The incipient ordoliberalism emerging within European monetary integration has proven a motor for further action.
As German economic strength was traded for a greater reliance on binding EU rules, this has over time resulted in
pressure for further integration, and not necessarily in a direction that Germany might ultimately have wished for.
Our analysis demonstrates how the four sources of error have impacted German policy-making, and not necessarily
for the better.
First, ignorance lay mostly in Germany’s lack of comprehension during the pre-crisis phase of the conditions in other
member states, believing rather insouciantly that the existing treaty framework (and the Stability and Growth Pact)
would take care of matters. As a result, German actors awoke only rather belatedly to the urgency of the crisis,
initially extrapolating too far from their own (relatively benign) domestic circumstances to conclude that this was a
crunch about which they could aﬀord to be relaxed.
Second, there was an error, illustrated in Chancellor Merkel’s fairly blunt remarks in August 2014 pointing to the
‘construction ﬂaws’ of EMU. The roots of this view date back to 1998 when the initial decision was taken on which
member states would join, when pervasive economic underperformance meant that only Luxembourg met the
criteria in full. Given the relaxation of the criteria to allow virtually every applicant (save, originally, Greece) to join,
Germany’s original vision for a smaller, more homogenous EMU never came to fruition.
Third, in terms of the immediacy of interests, the overriding stated interest of Germany (and the Eurogroup as a
whole) was in saving the euro, while not increasing the moral hazard inherent in the regulatory framework. Fulﬁlling
German interests thus involved antagonising neither their European partners nor the German public, and these twin
objectives (wrapped up in broader foreign policy) precluded longer term considerations.
Finally, basic values constituted a source of error. There is increasingly a sense in the Ministries that the other EU
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member states have, at least in principle, accepted the German economic philosophy (‘We were feeling very
comfortable that our philosophy of stability was adopted by everyone’). Despite Germany’s optimism regarding the
spread of an ordoliberal way of thinking, however, it still remains an open question whether it will be fully internalised
in the longer run among decision-makers in the member states hardest hit by the Eurozone crisis, and arguably it
has been an error for German policy makers to assume that it would be.
Germany has, in the eyes of many observers, come out of the Eurozone crisis in a position of particular strength.
The conﬁguration of European economic integration – and in particular EMU since the crisis – exhibits evidence of
incremental ‘ordoliberalisation’, which is especially apparent when the possible alternatives are considered.
Nonetheless, our interviews did suggest tensions between the competing objectives of German domestic politics,
and the country’s role in Europe, that seem to stem at least partially from the uploading of ordoliberal ideas to the EU
level.
It became clear to us through the interviews that there was a perceived correspondence between economic success
at home and the strength, credibility and legitimacy of a country’s voice in Europe – thus, translating ordoliberal
values to the EU level may be regarded as an end in itself for Germany. However, this has not come without a cost.
In adopting the ordoliberal precepts of EMU, periphery countries ﬁrst beneﬁted from importing German-inﬂuenced
economic policies, and then suﬀered when the removal of their monetary and ﬁscal room for manoeuvre exposed
severe structural weaknesses in their economies.
In this vein, many of the interviewees within the German ministries expressed a sense of bathos that although
Germany, as both a political actor and a source of institutional norms has eﬀectively ‘won’; this has resulted in a
large number of consequences that Germany neither foresaw nor wished for.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: For a longer discussion of this topic, see the authors’ recent article in the Journal of Common Market Studies .
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